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SOME DOUBTS ON CONSTITUTIONAL
INDETERMINACY
RICHARD

I.

A. EPsTEiN*

INTRODUCTION

A well known dualism lies at the heart of any theory of constitutional interpretation. On the one hand, any inquiry into this
subject could be directed to issues ofjudicial function and role.
How ought a court approach a particular text? Should it adopt a
posture of judicial activism or judicial restraint? Does it make a
difference whether the disputed text is concerned with the preservation of fundamental individual rights or with the defense of
economic or property interests, assuming that we can draw a
workable distinction between the two?
For these purposes, however, I am less interested in the question of judicial response to textual indeterminacy and more interested in the underlying philosophical and linguistic issue: how
much indeterminacy is there in the Constitution, and how much
of it is irreducible? The question not only sets the stage for taking
any judicial stance on interpretation, but it also throws light on
the entire enterprise of constitutionalism: if a text is so routinely
indeterminate that two judicial decisions that flatly contradict
each other can both be consistent with the relevant text, then
what is meant by the rule of law, understood in opposition to its
immortal opponent, the rule of men-often the rule of lawless
men? Not all disputed matters are subject to this concern: if the
issue is whether the police had probable cause to search, or
whether a driver exercised reasonable care, we expect the linedrawing questions implicit in the legal standard to generate close
cases at the margin. But on matters of basic structure and design-what is the proper division of authority between executive,
legislature, and judiciary-we cannot tolerate the same high
levels of uncertainty. Texts must be clear enough to bind those
who would like to violate their commands. Only then we can take
some comfort in ceding the coercive power of the state. But how
high should that comfort level be? And how high can it be?
* James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law, The University of
Chicago.
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ORDINARY DIscouRsE

To get some perspective on this issue, it is best to proceed by
indirection, that is, by asking how central is the problem of indeterminacy in the hurly-burly world of commerce and social affairs.' My strong impression is that language is a very efficient
mechanism for responding to these daily pressures. Usually when
people are wrestling with a knotty problem, they are much more
interested in knowing about the people involved in a dispute, the
facts that underlay it, and the customary practices used to resolve
it, than they are in a disquisition about the meaning of any particular term. Or, if they do not know the meaning of the term,
they assume that asking for its meaning can produce an answer
satisfactory to both inquirer and respondent. The language of
the trade must organizes a constant stream of transactions within
a given institutional framework. Even if the parties themselves
might not think of all the variations on a given problem, its repetitive nature will force them to focus on the most common variations, and will provoke, if only by trial and error, some kind of
stabilizing institutional response. Because of the long term cohesion of the group members, the norms that emerge will often
turn out to be simple, sensible and stable-a troika that we cannot always attribute to judicial interpretation. We do not witness
endless deliberations over the linguistic meaning of puts and
calls in disputes that arise at the Chicago Board of Trade.
Thus far I have focused on business settings with repeat players-the most hospitable environmental for developing determinate and clear legal rules. But often times the disagreements take
place between individuals who are drawn from different social
groups, which have very different understandings about the nature of ajust society or the proper resolution of some given problem. Yet, even in this context it is a mistake to assume that the
key barriers that separate these groups are those of terminology,
not substance. "Get out of Vietnam now" may be short, but in
1968 its message was crystal-clear to friend or foe alike. The political debates of the time did not quibble over how soon is "now."
To be sure, attitudes may be shaped by the powerful symbolic
effect in the choice of words: reverse discrimination is not the
phrase of choice for the ardent defender of affirmative action;
1. For one account, see Richard A. Epstein, ThePath to theTJ. Hooper: The Theory and
History of Custom in the Law of Tort; 21J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1992).
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and diversity is not the term of choice for its opponents. But however important the positive and negative connotations, what remains clear is that each side can understand, state, and oppose
the policy that is advocated by the other, and show how the difference in choices of approach leads to a difference in consequences, namely on such questions, as to who is in and who is
out. Indeed, in cases like this, once the social objective is clear,
then the stripping away of metaphor and verbiage may increase
the moral outrage to which it is subjected. Terminological underbrush may block ajoinder of issue in social settings, but not for
very long.
So why do the terminological issues come in? Sometimes for
good reason. There may be ambiguity in what my opponent (but
never my supporter) says, so that what looks like a clean logical
connection involves a desperate and impermissible leap of faith.
But ambiguity means that we use a symbol A to stand for either
Al or A2, and then allow Al to be in the premise (for example,
"ought" in its predictive sense) and then find that A2 resides in
the conclusion (for example, "ought" in the normative sense).
But ambiguity is a curable problem. Once the subscripts are added, or new terms are introduced, the ambiguity should disappear. Ambiguity presents no inherent, deep, philosophical
problem of interpretation. It only presents practical difficulties
where individual arguments misfire because of the careless, but
remediable, use of language. Surely sloppy texts are littered
throughout the law, but it is less threatening to have to clean up
a particular drafting mistake than to resolve the inescapable ambiguities that plague the most skillful native users of the language. And it is with this deep, rooted version of textual
indeterminacy that interpretation reaches its philosophical high.
Yet often the terminological or definitional points are used for
a quite different reason: if you have nothing to say on the merits,
you might, as a ploy, raise the specter of deep philosophical ambiguity to avoid some embarrassing silence. Suppose that B takes
A's car without permission, leaves A stranded away from home
and wrecks the car to boot. His reason: B simply wants to go on a
joyride. Now when met with the charge that his conduct was unreasonable and reprehensible, B may well be tempted to ask,
"What do you mean by unreasonable anyway?" But that question
is put in this general form precisely because no reason could be
offered to explain or to justify the act in question: that is, this is
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not a case in which B drove the car to help A's daughter to get to
work when she ran the risk of being fired for arriving late, a reason that works to B's advantage, not A's. We should always look
askance at flights to intellectual skepticism taken by individuals
in tight corners. So too we should be aware of the peril in judges
who take a disputed word, then put it between quotation marks,
and then observe that no one really knows what is meant by
"commerce" or "nuisance" anyway.
III.

CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION

Those two terms, "commerce" and "nuisance," are not, I might
add, simply picked out at random. Rather, they are chosen because both have had an important role in structuring constitutional deliberation over the scope of government powers we have
inherited today. But why these terms instead of others? It is here
that legal disputes do have one critical difference from ordinary
social disagreements. Precedents and statutes and constitutions
contain particular words that confer powers, limit jurisdiction,
create rights, and impose duties. These words are like the critical
fortifications on a battlefield. You have to take them in order to
win. To control the entire territory you must control the crossroads and the high bluffs. If the outposts must be taken or defended, then most of the heavy artillery will line up on either side
of the disputed term. Just that "do-or-die" quality induces people
to make desperation stands one way or another about particular
terms, including "commerce" and "nuisance," that are situated at
the key constitutional terrain.
The Commerce Clause is an example of one of those outposts
that must be overrun because it cannot be skirted. If asked what
commerce meant in a world devoid of constitutional overtones,
the answer would likely suggest, trade of all sorts and description,
and the mechanisms that make that trade possible: for example,
the instruments of transportation.2 Surely when one speaks of
commercial zoning, one does not include within that designation
manufacturing zones; and when the National Association of Manufacturers looks for its members, it does not seek out railroads
2. For my views on this subject, see Richard A. Epstein, The ProperScope of the Commerce
Power,73 VA. L. REv. 1387 (1987), which I am happy to say seem to have found some new
life in United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995), on which my views can be found in
Richard A. Epstein, ConstitutionalFaith and the Commerce Clause, 71 Norma DAME L. Ra.
167 (1996).
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and airlines; and the Uniform Commercial Code deals with sales,
negotiable instruments, and security interests, and not with the
construction of heavy industrial equipment.
That ordinary sense of commerce fits in quite well with the
constitutional provision that gives Congress the power to regulate "Commerce with Foreign Nations, among the several States,
and with the Indian Tribes."' The meaning of these terms is if
anything made more dear by its context. It takes little imagination to see, but much courage to admit, that Article I to the Constitution contains a list of enumerated powers that are
"delegated" to Congress, either by the people or by the several
States. If the desire is to preserve a federal government that regulates some particular affairs, but not all affairs, then no single
clause of Article I could give Congress the right to regulate anything it chooses. But during the critical period of the New Deal,
the political consensus thought that it was a good thing to make
everything a federal case, lest competition between the States, or
lack of coordination among them, allow powerful private actors
to escape effective regulation at any level. So the intellectual engines of constitutional interpretation were brought out to overturn the established rules that commerce meant trade among the
several States, and began where agriculture and manufacturing
ended.4 Hence all things which have some "indirect effect" on
commerce came to count as commerce among the several States.
In fact, the Supreme Court has said in so many words that it
would be mistaken to assume that "Commerce among the several
States" merely means only "Commerce among the several
States."5 How naive! Rather, it means everything that has an indirect effect on commerce among the several States, including
feeding your own wheat to your own livestock, the solemn holding in Wickard v. Filbum,6 a decision as beautifully written as it is
fundamentally misguided.
3. U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
4. See United States v. E.C. Knight, 156 U.S. 1, 12-16 (1895); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S.
(9 Wheat) 1, 188-90 (1824).
5. "The commerce power is not confined in its exercise to the regulation of commerce
among the states. It extends to those activities intrastate that so affect interstate commerce, or the exertion of the power of Congress over it, as to make regulation of them
appropriate means to the attainment of a legitimate end, the effective execution of the
granted power to regulate interstate commerce." Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 124
(1942) (quoting United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 119 (1942)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
6. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).

HeinOnline -- 19 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol'y 367 1995-1996

368

HarvardJournalof Law & PublicPolicy

[Vol. 19

Of course we could have a spirited dispute over the question
whether the constitution should allow the federal government to
regulate the domestic consumption of homegrown wheat on the
grounds that this practice will influence the price of grains in
domestic and international markets. If asked to pass on that
question I would argue that Congress should not be allowed to
regulate the price of homegrown wheat precisely because home
consumption influences the price of wheat in domestic and international markets. But the question of constitutional interpretation is not whether we like state-sponsored cartels in the grain
business. It is whether that domestic consumption of grains is
part of commerce among the several States. When that question
is put to ordinary speakers of the English language they respond
to it not with a learned disquisition, but with a giggle. It is clear
that the desirability of a given end has been allowed to overcome
the plain interpretation of the English language and to create a
federal power that, if candidly acknowledged at the Framing,
would have scuttled the new constitution of 1787 even before the
ratification debates began. Imagine the political outcry if some
learned scribe had anticipated future disputes and had sought to
tidy up matters in advance by writing: "Congress has Power...
To regulate Commerce with Foreign Nations, among the several
States, and with the Indian Tribes, or any activity which indirectly
affects that Commerce, including (without limitation) manufacture, production, mining and agriculture, and all useful trades,
occupations, and professions that take place within any single
State." It is comforting to know that slavery could have been regulated by Congress before 1860, and that the confirmed abolitionists among the senators and representatives of that day were,
unaccountably, just too misinformed to use their evident federal
powers to the hilt.
My criticism of the current wisdom on interpretation should
not be read to preclude the possibility of some disagreement at
the margins. Rather, it is to insist that the margins can be properly identified only after the central issues have been properly
resolved. Even if we stay away from the extravagant interpretations of the Commerce Clause, there is a fair bit of interpretive
work to be done under the Clause, as all the difficult litigation
prior to the 1937 transformation of the subject matter indicates.
But here we can take some comfort in noting that the harder the
case, the less its importance for our overall legal and social struc-
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ture. Thus we could have very interesting debates as to whether
taxicabs that pick up passengers from interstate flights are in interstate commerce (answer: no), but it is quite clear that even if
they are, they leave interstate commerce once they leave the airport, or reach their home or downtown hotel. No matter which
way this case comes out, we do not find in this difficult decision
any mandate for the agricultural or labor or environmental controls that now routinely operate at the federal level. There is a
level of ambiguity that is both tolerable and unavoidable. But we
have long since crossed that line in our Commerce Clause
jurisprudence.

IV. TAKINGS

AND NuIsANcE

The question of constitutional interpretation also extends to
matters that are left unsaid by the basic text. Perhaps the most
famous illustration of this sort concerns the scope of the police
power. The words "police power" are nowhere found in the text
of the Constitution, yet some version of the police power limitation operates as a limitation on every substantive guarantee contained in the constitution. Even if speech is a preferred
freedom,7 no one thinks that the freedom of speech includes the
right to participate with impunity in a conspiracy to commit murder or to practice an old-fashioned con game.
So what are the limits of the police power? Clearly they have
something at least to do with the obvious proposition that the
police (narrowly construed) have the right to prevent certain
wrongs against the persons and property of other individualsl
One such traditional wrong has been the commission of common law nuisances by one person against the lands of his neighbors. But the question then arises, what constitutes a nuisance?
The traditional accounts of the subject stress the nature of physical invasions that cause unreasonable interference with the use
and enjoyment of the property of another.' And there is little
doubt that environmental regulation done at the state (or, alas,
at the federal level) that is targeted against those activities cannot

7. See U.S. CoNsr. amend. I ("Congress shall make no la..... abridging the freedom of
speech ....").
8. See RESTATEMENr (SECOND) op TORTS §§ 826-830 (1977).
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be treated (for that reason) as a taking of property without
compensation. 9
Nonetheless it becomes quite clear from the chequered history
of the takings law that the question what constitutes a nuisance
sometimes receives a rather different answer, so that virtually anything that the State declares to be a nuisance is something that it
can regulate with impunity. The net effect of this aggressive position is that one can claim that right to stop an individual from
building an ordinary beachfront home,1 0 or from putting a set of
railroad ties for a walkway into the side of the hill. Ordinary actions of husbandry become wrongs in the eyes of the State, which
can then be regulated without compensation. In the original
granddaddy of zoning cases, Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,"
Justice Sutherland was able to persuade himself that the construction of high-rise apartment houses in single-family neighbor
hoods "come very near to being nuisances" although neither case
law nor the standard common law definitions support that general proposition. Most impressively, however, even Justices who
have some partiality toward the protection of property rights find
themselves drawn into linguistic snares. One instructive illustration is Justice Scalia's opinion in Lucas v South Carolina Coastal
Counci4l'2 which explains in painful detail and always in quotation marks, that "noxious use" tests cannot explain the law of
"takings;" that the distinction "harm-preventing" and "benefitconferring" is "often in the eye of the beholder.""5 But Justice
Scalia cannot make the argument quite go. Thus he writes:
It is quite possible, for example, to describe in eitherfashion
the ecological, economic, and aesthetic concerns that inspired
the South Carolina legislature in the present case. One could
say that imposing a servitude on Lucas's land is necessary in
order to prevent his use of it from "harming" South Carolina's
ecological resources; or, instead,14in order to achieve the "benefits" of an ecological preserve.
9. See U.S. CONsr. amend. V ("nor shall private property be taken for public use, with-

out just compensation").

10. See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2901-02 (1992).
11. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
12. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
13. Id. at 2897. Nor is he alone-his classmate Frank Michelman is similarly partial to
the quotation mark in his classic paper, Property, Utilty, andFairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of 7ust Compensation"Law,80 HAxv. L.. RFv. 1165, 1196-201 (1967).
14. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 289798.
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But his example contains a latent ambiguity that, once exposed, reveals the weakness of his characterization. Do "South
Carolina's ecological resources" include only those lands to
which the State has fee title, or does it also include the lands that
are subject to private ownership, as with the Lucas property, but
which fall within the territory of the State? If Justice Scalia uses
the former definition, then the question of harm depends on a
showing of some spillover effects on other property, which is
hard to do with the building of a new single family home. If he
takes the second route, he has to show how the State, consistent
with a regime of private property, can obtain title to resources
simply by asserting that any use causes harm to others. If Lucas is
the owner of his property, which entitles him to exclusive possession and exclusive use, then the endless degrees of intellectual
freedom posited in the Justice Scalia analysis disappear.
In all judicial decision, however, the moment of reckoning
comes when the judge (or Justice) has to put forward his own
legal rule to govern a situation. Here the doubts of the critic have
to give way to the clarity of the lawgiver. Indeed, I am happy to
report thatJustice Scalia himself displays in a pinch no allegiance
to his own skeptical ruminations. Witness his instant transformation into a classical common lawyer. The quotation marks now
(largely) disappear, and we are told:
The "total taking" inquiry we require today will ordinarily
entail (as the application of state nuisance law ordinarily entails) analysis of, among other things, the degree of harm to
public lands and resources, or adjacent private property,
posed by the claimant's proposed activities, see, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 826, 827, the social value of the
claimant's activities and their suitability to the locality in questdon, see, e.g., id., §§ 828(a) and (b), 831, and the relative ease
with which the alleged harm can be avoided through measures
taken by the claimant and the government (or adjacent private landowners) alike, see, e.g., id., §§ 827(e), 828(c), 830.
The fact that a particular use has long been engaged in by
similarly situated owners ordinarily imports a lack of any common-law prohibition (though changed circumstances or new
knowledge may make what was previously permissible no
longer so, see Restatement (Second) of Torts, supra, § 827,
comment g. So also does the fact that other landowners, similarly situated, are permitted to continue the use denied to the
claimant.
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It seems unlikely that common-law principles would have
prevented the erection of any habitable or productive improvements on petitioner's land .... 15

It is not my habit to quote at length fromjudicial decisions and
to leave in public view all cross-references to the Restatement (Second) of Torts. But some philosophical cunning lies behind this tedium. The first point is that this passage strips away the ambiguity
raised injustice Scalia's philosophical discursusabout harms and
benefits on South Carolina's. Now we know that the harm to be
shown has to be to the property of others, private or public, and
that the State cannot justify this regulation for the protection of
"its" resources. Second, we know the body of law that we have to
look to: the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which contains certain
ambiguities (and mistakes) in its treatment of the law of nuisance, but which never succumbs to the philosophical doubts
that pervade Justice Scalia's previous speculations. Justice Scalia
has picked his source wisely. Whatever the defects of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, it was not drafted for this occasion, and thus
escapes the charge that its substantive commands were drafted to
advance covertly one constitutional position or another. Its conclusion are far more reliable in that regard than any expert testimony on the meaning, or lack thereof, of the term nuisance that
is prepared for the occasion.
In this Article, it is not possible to comment at length about
the shabby and inconsistent treatment that the common law tort
of nuisance has received at the hands of the judges in the context
of property takings.'" But it is worth noting that when nuisancelike justifications are offered for the restriction of first amendment rights of speech, the linguistic skepticism disappears. It is
no longer possible for the legislature to prevail by passing a law
in which "it is hereby declared a public nuisance for any ticket
seller.., connected with a drive-in theater in the City to exhibit
...any motion picture.., in which the human male or female
bare buttocks, human female bare breasts, or human bare pubic
areas are shown, if such motion picture.., is visible for any public street or public place."' 7 The declaration did not cut it. The
ordinance disappeared without a trace, and no deference was
15. Id. at 2901.

16. For an example of such a commentary, see Douglas W. Kmiec, At Last, the Supreme

Court Solves the Takings Puzzle, 19 H v. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 147 (1995).

17. Erznoznik v. City ofJacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 206-07 (1975) (citing and striking

down JAcicsown.vE, FLA. ORDwNANcE § 330,313 (1972)).
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paid to the legislative determination, even though its account of
a public nuisance was far closer to the common law conceptions
than anything that the legislature had to offer in for its Coastal
Management Act in Lucas.
V.

CONCLUSION

Both general political discourse and constitutional theory pose
many important questions of principle. But these queries should
be treated for what they are: important points of principle that
are capable of principled resolution. So it is here that the link
between linguistic theory and judicial role is so important. One
reason to start with a uniform presumption of strict scrutiny of all
enactments is to keep courts on good intellectual behavior. Instead of dreaming up reasons why a legislature "could think" this
or that, the high standard requires the legislature to present its
reasons and to show why they count in the grand scheme of
things. This difference is one with real bite. To take a mathematical example, the rational basis test allows the legislature to say
that 2 + 2 = 5, because after all the result is close, and others have
made that mistake before and doubtless will do so again. But I
prefer to think that a higher level of aspiration is both desirable
and achievable. In constitutional adjudication, the legislature
must learn to balance its sums, and to answer 4. To be sure, in
matters political, it is not possible to balance the sums with this
level of precision. But by the same token, if we are content with
answers that we know to be false, when will never achieve those
having at least some chance of being true.
And therein lies the vice of so much modem constitutional
interpretation. The question it asks for itself is not what the Constitution, fairly read, requires. Rather it is, what methods of constitutional interpretation have to be invented to sustain massive
federal power and provides only limited protection to private
property. Engrafting that instinctive large government bias onto
a small government doctrine is what produces the intellectual
gymnastics that so often pass for constitutional interpretation.
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